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NOTES

Although the Standard Oil case did not deal with copyrights,
the statements made by the Court as to intangibles are certainly
applicable to copyrights. Based upon the Standard Oil rationale
and the fact that state courts are competent tribunals for the
determination of assignments and titles to copyrights, 06 it appears
logically consistent that state courts are the proper forums for copyright mortgage foreclosure.
Conclusion
The copyright has until recently been predominantly used
by those in the entertainment industry. However, today other
commercial enterprises are realizing the value of copyrighting. The
toy industry, the game industry, and any of the many industries
which utilize designs, such as the clothing or container industries
are beginning to take advantage of the copyright laws. These
businesses, especially the smaller ones, might find it very desirable
to offer a copyright as collateral. However, if a creditor is going
to accept the copyright as security, then the copyright must be
readily marketable and the security interest in the copyright must
be capable of adequate perfection.
If the lack of decisional law is a forecast of the impracticality
of mortgaging the copyright, it is due to the ambiguity in the law
and not to any inadequacy of the copyright as personalty.

)X
TnE SECURITiES ACTS AmENDMENTS OF 1964:

EFFECT ON THE

OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
The diversity and lack of organization of the over-the-counter
markets have continuously perplexed those seeking to regulate
them. The framers of the Securities Exchange Act stated that
both the exchange and the over-the-counter markets were "affected
with a national public interest." I However, the Act of 1934,
while subjecting the exchange markets to detailed regulation,
did not provide like provisions for the over-the-counter markets.
Rather, it granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission broad
rule-making power in relation to the over-the-counter market,
without, however, providing any guidelines for the exercise of
106 See cases cited note 100 .supra.

I Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(1958).
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that power. 2 During the following years, both the Commission
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, which utilized
the principle of self-regulation established by the Maloney Act,3
made significant advances in regulating the over-the-counter markets
and raising the business standards of its participants. 4 Despite these
advances, there has been a persistent effort to extend to unlisted
securities the disclosure and other safeguards applicable to listed
securities. 5 Generally, the problems involved in effecting such
extended coverage have been: (1) the precise scope and standards
of coverage, and (2) the impact of the insider-trading provisions
on broker-dealers who are also corporate insiders. 6
The resolution of these problems finds expression in the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1 9 6 4 ,7 which effect a sweeping
extension of the authority of the SEC in the field of federal
securities regulation. The purpose of this note is to discuss the
scope of those provisions of the new law which extend federal
regulation to the over-the-counter markets, and to examine the
problems both solved and created by these amendments.
The Need for Adequate Protection
The same basic principles of "public interest" and "investor
protection" which compelled Congress to establish the disclosure
provisions for investors in listed securities are applicable to the
over-the-counter markets.8 Investors in exchange-listed securities
or in the over-the-counter markets have the same need for accurate
information as a basis for investment decisions and as a protection
against fraud and manipulation. Also, the danger of misuse by
insiders of confidential corporate information is as great in one
market as in the other. The need for full disclosure is perhaps
even more urgent in the over-the-counter markets, since these
2

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 48 Stat 895, as amended, 49

Stat. 1377 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958) (amended by 72 Stat. 565 (1964),
13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2804-05 (1964)).

3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A, as added, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938),
15 U.S.C. § 78 o-3 (1958) (amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 13 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. N-ws 2810-15
4 The Commission and

(1964)).
the National Association of Securities Dealers

established broker-dealer inspection programs, adopted further rules prohibiting fraudulent and unethical practices, and developed higher standards
through administrative and disciplinary proceedings and litigation.

C.F.R. §240.15d-9 (1964);

E.g., 17

Markup Policy G-5 (1960).
5 See Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 md the Investment
NASD

MANuAL,

Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 214, 220 (1958).
6 See 2 Loss, SEcuarmns REGULATION 1149-64 (2d ed. 1961).

7 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
(1964)).
8

(13 U.S.

CoDE

CoNG.

& AD. Naws 2798-2817

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 48 Stat. 881,
§78b (1958).

15 U.S.C.
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markets include some relatively unknown, unsubstantial, and unseasoned issues. 9
The practices of over-the-counter issues, in respect to reports,
proxy solicitation, and insider-trading, present a striking contrast
to the practices of issuers subject to the regulations of the SEC
in these areas. Although the non-regulated companies were not
required to file financial reports with the Commission, many have
voluntarily provided financial data to the financial manuals and
to their shareholders. However, other companies in this category
either make no reports to shareholders at all or their reports are
meager and inadequate, Deficiencies in financial data reporting
include failure to classify inventories, failure to state the method
of valuing inventories, failure to include explanatory notes, and
lack of certification. 10
In addition, the proxy-solicitation practices of both groups
present striking divergencies. One study of the proxy-solicitation
practices of issuers of unlisted shares revealed the following major
deficiencies: (1) a failure to state the names of nominees in
solicitations for the election of directors; (2) a failure to provide
a place for a "yes" or "no" vote relating to major proposals;
(3) a failure of proxies relating to bonus, profit-sharing, and management-remuneration plans to state the cost of such plans; and
(4) a failure of proxies relating to mergers, consolidations, acouisitions, and similar matters to state the effect of the proposed
transaction on present security holders."
A third area in which investors in over-the-counter securities
need protection involves insider-trading abuses. Abuses in this
area are great because of the concurrence of a lack of reliable
and current information and because many over-the-counter issuers
are insider controlled .1 2 In the absence of the same deterrents
that are currently imposed on insiders who trade in exchangelisted securities, the insiders in the over-the-counter market enjoy
unparalleled opportunities for short-swing profits.
The Registration Requirement

Issuers to be Included
It was necessary for the framers of the new statute to
achieve a balance of practical considerations in determining to
9

For a detailed analysis of the heterogeneity of the over-the-counter
REPORT or SPECIAL StmY F ScuRrTrms MAnn-rs oF THE
SEcuRiTs AxD ExciANAGE CommiSSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 2, at 546-53 (1963) (hereinafter cited as SPE-IAL STUDY).
I 10An analysis of the reporting practices of the over-the-counter issuers,
as determined by an examination of the annual reports of a selected group
of such issuers, may be found in SPIAL SrTUY pt. 3, at 10-12.
"I The results of one survey in this area are found in SPECIAL STUDY

market, see SEC,

Pt. 3, at 12-14.
S12e

PECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 14.
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which issuers on the over-the-counter market the requirements of
the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act should be extended.
Complete protection would have been afforded if the requirement
of disclosure extended to all companies in which there were outside shareholders, no matter how few. However, practicality
calls for a standard of coverage which is both reasonably reliable
and easily enforceable. Such a standard would include only those
issuers which are substantial enough in terms of public interest to
warrant both the burden of compliance imposed on the issuer,
and the high cost of regulation imposed on the government.
In the 1964 amendments, Congress attempted to achieve this
delicate balance by employing a phased program of registration
in order to ease the burden of compliance. Two tests were
established to determine the registration status of issuers: the
shareholder test and the asset test. Issuers with assets in excess
of one million dollars will be required to register each class of
equity security held of record by at least 750 persons. 13 However,
issuers of securities held of record by more than 500 but less than4
750 persons will be given a two-year postponement for registration.1
In addition, registration is required only if the issuer is engaged
in interstate commerce or if its securities are traded by use of the
mails or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.' 5 The purpose
of the mail and instrumentalities provisions is, of course, to
clearly furnish a constitutional basis for federal regulation.
The shareholder test has long been recognized as probably
"the single most workable and most meaningful criterion" of
public-investor interest.' 6 However, in order to arrive at the
stockholder number which would accurately reflect public interest,
the framers of the amendments had to consider certain other
factors. The first relationship considered was that between the
number of shareholders and the number of transfers of record,
since such transfers help to distinguish actively traded securities
from inactive ones. Furthermore, each transaction may increase the
number of investors to whom statutory protection will be available.
The results of a questionnaire addressed to a representative sample
of issuers 17 revealed that a comparison of the number of record
shareholders with the number of record transfers indicated a general
correspondence between the two. For example, where there were
between 25 and 299 shareholders the proportion of issuers showing
13Securities

565 (1964)

Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1) (A), as added, 78 Stat.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 2800 (1964)).

(13 U.S.

'1 Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, § 12(g) (1) (B), as added, 78 Stat.

565 (1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2800-01 (1964)).
's Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1), as added, 78 Stat. 565
(1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2800-01 (1964)).
16 SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 18.
17 A discussion of the method used in selecting the issuers as well as a
listing of the principal data requested in questionnaire OTC-4 may be found
in SPECrAL STUDY pt. 3, at 18-19.
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25 or more transfers ranged from a negligible 7.9 per cent to a
clear majority of 61.1 per cent. However, beginning at the 300
shareholder level a majority of companies showed at least 100
transfers, a clear shift from a preponderance of less active to more
active stocks.' s Therefore, the relationship between shareholders
and transfers was clear evidence and a vivid illustration of how
a number-of-shareholders criterion could be used to evaluate the
public interest in an issue which would be sufficient to warrant
regulation.
The second relationship considered involved
a comparison
between the number of shareholders and the concentration of
holdings. Concentration of holdings is pertinent in two respects:
(1) in appraising the significance of mere numbers of shareholders
at any given time, and (2) in weighing the significance of proxy
and insider-trading provisions. Data obtained in a recent study
indicates that below the 1000 shareholder level, over half of
the companies are more than 50 per cent owned by the ten largest
holders. Where there were between 500 and 749 shareholders,
the determinative category under the new law, the number of
companies owned by the ten largest holders is just under one-half
of the total. 10 The figures are an overstatement, however, because
only record holdings were considered since the number of beneficial
owners could not be determined. 20 Nevertheless, the correlation
between the number of shareholders and the concentration of holdings again indicates how the number-of-shareholders criterion could
be employed not only to measure the size of the group most
immediately to be protected, but also to indicate the level at which
the need for protection is substantially increased by a significant
increase in the number of holders.
The third relationship, that between the number of shareholders and dealers' trading interest, is important in two respects:
(1) in distinguishing actively traded from other securities, and
(2) in relation to insider-trading protection where the dealer is
also an insider. Comparisons of the number of broker-dealers
entering wholesale quotations in the "sheets" of the National
Quotation Bureau 21 with the number of shareholders indicate that
from the 300 shareholder level upward the indices reveal an
increase in public interest and trading activity. Thus, more than
60 per cent of the companies having from 300 to 749 shareholders
Is The correspondence is indicated by SPEcALk STUDY pt. 3, at 21.
19 These comparisons are indicated by SPEciAL STUDY pt. 3, table IX-d.
at 30.
20 SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 30 n.48.
21 The "sheets" published by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. are of
crucial importance to the over-the-counter markets since they are the primary
medium for the dissemination of wholesale or "inside" quotations among
professionals. They are used to find and communicate buying or selling
interests in securities and to judge activity. A detailed study of the "Bureau"
is found in SPEciAL STUDY pt. 2, at 595-609.
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have one or more quotations. A roughly corresponding increase
in activity and broker-dealer interest is evident as one continues
to move up the shareholder levels.2 2 It is important to note,
however, that the significance to be attached to the comparisons is
subject to the important qualification that a numerical count of
quotations necessarily ignores the large qualitative differences
between them. A single appearance of a large New York City
wholesale market-maker presumably indicates a greater likelihood
of active trading than does a similar appearance of a more obscure
broker-dealer. Nevertheless, the comparisons indicate the probable
size of the group most directly affected by statutory protections
as well as the shareholder level at which the need for protection
is substantially increased.
The data set forth above indicate that at and above the 300
shareholder level, trading activity, as measured by transfers and
dealer interest, becomes significant for a majority of issuers.
It is clear also that under any definition of "public" for purposes
of the protections afforded by the securities laws, a company
23
with 300 or more shareholders of record is deemed to be public.
Even at the level of 300 shareholders, however, the data tend to
indicate such a large number of companies covered that the
would be unable to shoulder the administrative burden
Commission
24
involved.
In the interest of feasibility, therefore, a second criterion,
the asset test, was established to determine which issuers should
be affected by the extended regulations. The amount of assets
would seem to be no more than a secondary criterion, at best,
since there is an absence of a clear or necessary relationship
between total assets and the equity interest of investors to be
protected.25 In its Special Study, the Securities and Exchange
Commission Committee thought that such an asset limit could,
26
in theory, be justified only if expressed in a very modest amount.
Nevertheless, the practical effect of including the asset test in
conjunction with the shareholder test is a significant reduction
in the number of companies affected by the regulations. One study
of a selected group of issuers indicated that a one million dollar
asset limit in the new law would remove about 22 per cent of all
companies at the 300 or more shareholder level, 17 per cent at the
500 or more shareholder level, and 13 per cent at the 750 or more
shareholder level. 27 By including the asset test in the amendments
as passed, it is probable that Congress recognized the significant

22

See

SPECIAL STUDY

pt. 3, table IX-b, at 22, chart IX-c, at 22.

23 SPECIAL STUDY pt 3, at 34.
24 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 34.
25 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, table
26 SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 32-33.
27 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 33.

IX-c, at 27, chart IX-d, at 29.
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role such a test would play in keeping the number of issuers affected
at a practical level for administrative regulation.
In establishing a two-phased program and in setting the
appropriate standard of coverage at the 500 shareholder level,
Congress did not follow the recommendation of the Special Study
which provided for a third phase covering issuers at the 300
shareholder level, the level thought to be the appropriate permanent
standard. 28 Rather, Congress recognized the fact that administrative
needs required a shareholder test which was both consistent with
the limits imposed by the asset test and indicative of the level at
which public interest became clearly marked. A study of pertinent
data showed 29that both requirements are fulfilled at the 500 shareholder level.

Termination of Registration
The significance of the 300 shareholder level is, however,
recognized in the termination provision of the new law.30 A registration will terminate when the number of shareholders is reduced
to less than 300 and proper application and certification of such
fact is made by the issuer. The registration will terminate 90
days after such certification, unless the SEC decides to terminate
it earlier. Termination may be denied, however, if there is a
question as to the truth of the certification.
Effective Date of Registration
Issuers required to register under the new law must do so
within 120 days after the last day of the fiscal year on which they
first meet the conditions requiring registration. 31 Thus, if a corporation has a fiscal year ending August 31, and if on August
31, 1964, it had assets of one million dollars and a class of equity
security held by at least 750 persons, it must file a registration
statement for that security within 120 days. However, the SEC
has the authority to grant extensions of time for any issuer or class
of issuers. 32 The effective date of a registration statement is 60
days after filing, but it may become effective within a shorter
28 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 34. The committee made its proposal in
light of the fact that the deficiencies in reporting and proxy solicitation are
prevalent in substantially the same degree in the case of those companies
having at least 300 shareholders.
29 See SPECIAL SmDY pt. 3, table IX-5, at 107.
30 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (3), as added, 78 Stat. 565
(1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2802 (1964)).
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), as added, 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
(13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws 2800-02 (1964)).
32Id. at 2800-01. Corporations with between 500-749 stockholders are
required to wait two years before they are allowed to register.
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period by direction of the SEC.8 3 The importance of the date of
effectiveness lies in the fact that any false or misleading statements
which the registration may contain will not render the issuer liable,
under the civil liability sanctions of Section 18 of the Securities

Exchange Act,8 4 to a person who has purchased or sold a security

in reliance on such statements until the registration becomes
effective.
Information Required
In addition to the information already required in the registration statements of exchange-listed issuers,3 5 the new law adds a
further category of information which must be disclosed by issuers
in both the exchange and over-the-counter markets seeking to
register public issues. Information in registration statements must
now include all "material contracts" made by the issuer within
the two years preceding such registration or which are to be
executed, in whole or in part, at or after the registration.86
The statute defines a "material contract" as one "not made in the
ordinary course of business." ' 37 The only contracts expressly
deemed to be in this category by the statute are "every material
patent or contract for a material patent right." 38 Committee
Reports indicated that the contracts included in this category
will be similar to those about which such information was required
in registering an initial issue of securties under the Securities Act
of 1933." 9 Contracts deemed to be "material" for purposes of
regulation under that act included any management contract or
contract providing for special bonuses or profit-sharing arrangements, and every contract in which a public utility company, or its
affiliate, agreed to give or receive technical or financial advice
or service for which the annual charge to any party was in excess
of 2,500 dollars.4 0 In addition to these specific examples, any
contract about which a reasonably prudent investor ought to have
been informed before purchasing a registered security was deemed
to be a "material contract." 41 In the absence of a clear statutory
definition, it is anticipated that the Commission will administer
these requirements "in such a manner as not to be unduly burdenIbid.
Ibid.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b) (1), 48 Stat. 892, 15
U.S.C. § 781(b)(1) (1958) (amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 13 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2799 (1964)).
36 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b) (1) (I), as added, 78 Stat.
565 (1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2799 (1964)).
37 Ibid.
33
34
35

38 Ibid.
39 S. REP.

No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1963).
Securities Act of 1933, schedule A, item 24, 48 Stat. 88, 90, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aa (1958).
41 In the Matter of Winnebago Distilling Co., 6 S.E.C. 926 (1940).
40
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some to business." 4 However, full disclosure for the protection
of the public will remain the primary consideration, and, in light
of this fact, the provision should be subject to an interpretation
favoring investors. The statute does not indicate what information
is to be included, but it is likely that the Commission will require
the type of information required under the similar provision of
the Securities Act. Such information must include dates of and
parties to such "material contracts," as43well as a concise statement
of the general effect of such a contract.
Liability for Failure to Register
In contrast to the mechanics of the requirement for exchangetraded securities, the registration requirement for over-the-counter
securities is directed at the issuer and not at brokers and dealers 44
Under the provisions of the 1934 Act, liability for a transaction in
an unregistered security on an exchange falls upon the brokerdealer effecting such transaction. 45 However, since the new law
does not make it unlawful for a broker or dealer to effect over-thecounter transactions in unregistered securities which are subject
to the registration requirement of the new law, a broker or dealer
doing so will not be subject to civil liabilities or criminal penalties.
Rather, enforcement of the new registration requirement for overthe-counter securities is aimed directly at the issuer, since it is
the issuer, rather than the broker-dealer, who will be in possession
of the facts determinative of the registration status of an over-thecounter issue. Under the new law, the SEC has the express power,
upon the failure of any issuer to register, and after a hearing to
determine whether there has been a violation of the act, to issue
an order demanding compliance with the registration requirement.4 6
Should an issuer fail to obey a compliance order, the SEC may
apply to a federal district court for enforcement of the order.47
The SEC may also suspend trading of the issue for a ten-day
period,48 and in appropriate cases, invoke criminal sanctions. 49

CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws 3080 (1964).
Securities Act of 1933, schedule A, item 24, 48 Stat. 88, 90, 15 U.S.C.
§77aa (1958).
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), as added, 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
(13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2800-02 (1964)).
45 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(a), 48 Stat 892, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(a) (1958).
46 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c) (4), as added, 78 Stat. 565
(1964) (13 U.S. CODE COXG. & AD. Naws 2809 (1964)).
47 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(f), 48 Stat 899, 901, as amended,
49 Stat. 1379 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (1958).
48 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c) (5), as added, 78 Stat. 565
(1964) (U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. Nmvs 2809 (1964)).
49 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 49
Stat. 1380 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1958).
42
43

13 U.S.
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Banks and Insurance Companies
Under the new law, banks and insurance companies are given
special consideration. Banks, whose deposits are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and who meet the general
registration conditions outlined previously, do not register their
issues with the SEC. Rather, they are required to register their
securities in accordance with the procedures established by the appropriate federal bank regulatory agency.5" Some disclosure provisions, such as periodic reporting, proxy, and insider-trading, of the
1934 Act will apply to bank securities 5 and will be administered
by the same agency.52 By including banks among the issuers subject
to the new requirement, Congress recognized the fact that the registration provisions of the new act are essential to protect investors in
bank securities. Congress obviously felt that the existing regulation
protect depositors and was not
of banks was designed primarily 5to
3
adequate for investment purposes.
Insurance companies, on the other hand, are exempted from
the new registration requirement on the condition that they are
subject to state regulations which, comparable to that offered under
the new federal law, will furnish protection to investors. 4 Existing
state regulation, however, is not designed primarily to protect investors, but is intended for the benefit of policyholders. 55 In order
that an insurance company meet the conditions for exemption, therefore, state regulation, which has been described as "less and less
meaningful" when matched against the "more and more relevant"
disclosure policy of the securities acts, 55 must become more concerned with investor-oriented protections in the areas of disclosure,
proxy-solicitation, and insider-trading. The requirement that there
be insider-trading regulation is postponed for two years to enable
state legislatures to adopt necessary regulatory statutes.57 Regulation of proxy solicitations, consents, and authorizations is effected
through state administrative action.5"

50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(i), as added, 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
(13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2803 (1964)).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 For an analysis of the protection afforded investors in bank securities
by federal and state regulation, see SPEcIAL2 STuDY pt. 3, at 35-39.
54 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1 (g) (2) (G), as added, 78 Stat.
565 (1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2802 (1964)).
55 An analysis of the investor protection afforded by state regulation of
insurance companies is set forth in SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 40-42.
56 SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 85 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
_5Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g) (2) (G) (ii). as added, 78
Stat. 565 (1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2802 (1964)).
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(N) (2) (G) (i). (ii). as added,
78 Stat. 565 (1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2802 (1964)).
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Regulation of Proxy Solicitation

Pursuant to the broad powers given by the 1934 Act to prescribe rules relating to the solicitation of proxies,59 the SEC has
adopted a variety of rules prescribing the information which must
be furnished by management when proxies are solicited from holders
of exchange-listed stocks.60 The new law broadens the authority
of the SEC by extending it to proxies solicited from holders of
over-the-counter securities which are registered pursuant to the
new provisions.6 '
In the past, corporate recognition of the record owner limited
the distribution of solicitation material to such person, thereby
denying the beneficial owner the opportunity to decide whether
and to whom a proxy should be given.6 2 While the 1934 Act
provided that proxies could be given by exchange members in
accordance with rules prescribed by the SEC,63 the SEC did not
in fact promulgate proxy rules to protect the beneficial owners of
the stock. The reason for this inaction was the lack of power
possessed by the SEC to compel the broker or dealer who was
the record owner of the stock to give proxies at all when requested
by the beneficial owner. However, some stock exchanges have
adequately protected the beneficial owners of stock by adopting
rules regulating proxy solicitation." No such rules were adopted
by the over-the-counter markets. In an attempt to remedy this
deficiency the new law provides that no exchange member or
registered broker or dealer can give or refrain from giving a proxy
in contravention of rules prescribed by the SEC, if the stock is
registered on an exchange or under the new provisions.65 By extending the rule-making power of the SEC to proxies for stock
traded only over-the-counter, investor protection comparable to that
afforded investors in exchange-listed stocks is provided. Protection
for the beneficial owner, in both markets, is provided by the power
given the
SEC to affirmatively require a broker or dealer to give
proxies. 66
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1958) (amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
28046 (1964)).
OSee 17 C.F.R. 240.14 (1964).

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 73
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2804 (1964)).
62 CCH, SEcUriTriES AcTs AmEN mErs or 1964 16 (1964).
63Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §14(b), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C.
§78n(b) (1958) (amended by 78 Stat 565 (1964), 13 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2804 (1964)).
64The New York Stock Exchange and some other exchanges have
adopted rules which regulate the giving of proxies by members. See NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUmE 450-55.
61

Stat. 565 (1964) (13 U.S.

05 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(b), 48 Stat 895, as amended,

78 Stat. 565 (1964) (13 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2804 (1964)).

6 Ibid.
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While the proxy rules which have been adopted by the SEC
serve other purposes, the basic philosophy underlying these rules
is to disclose information to stockholders. When corporate management fails to solicit proxies, it avoids such disclosure. While companies on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange agree to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders, 67
unlisted companies and companies listed on some exchanges are
subject to no similar requirement. 8 In order to insure disclosure to
stockholders when proxies are not solicited, the new law requires
that, prior to any stockholders' meeting, management file with the
SEC and furnish to stockholders information equivalent to that
which would be required if proxies were solicited."9
Regulation of Insider-Trading
The insider-trading provisions of the 1934 Act,70 formerly
applicable only to directors, officers, and qualifying stockholders
(those who own more than ten per cent of the stock) of companies
with equity securities listed on a national securities exchange, have
been extended to the same insiders of over-the-counter issuers with
registered securities. 71 The three means adopted by Congress to
control insider-trading consist
of a disclosure provision,7 2 an auto74
matic-recovery provision,73 and a provision against short sales.
There is no difference in the terms of the provisions as now applied
to insiders in both markets. However, the new law specifically
exempts from the short-swing profit and short-sale provisions those
broker-dealers who make markets for the stocks of certain issuers
while serving as directors of the issuing company.75
This exemption will undoubtedly give rise to much controversy
and discussion, especially in light of the Special Study's conclusion
that a general and broad exemption for such market-making transactions would not be warranted. 76 However, if the automatic-re67 NEW
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(1964) (13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2804 (1964)).
70 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
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covery provision were applied to the director-market-maker, any
short-swing profits realized in the trading of the corporation's stock
would be recoverable by the corporation. Because of this loss of
profit, it may be presumed that the director-market-maker would
be forced either to resign or to terminate his trading. The forcing
of such a choice was not desirable in order to obtain the protection
of this section. The importance of this problem is emphasized by
the fact that many underwriters of new issues of securities place
on the issuer's board of directors as a common
representatives
77
practice.
The resolution of the problem is found in that section of the
new law which provides that the short-swing and "sale against
the box"'78 provisions will not apply to any purchase or sale
of an equity security not then or theretofore held by him [director-market-

maker] in an investment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his

by him of a
business and incident to the establishment or maintenance
79
primary or secondary market . . . for such security.

The SEC is given the authority to define the terms of the exemption, 0 which does not, of course, sanction misuse of inside
information. It is probable that Congress granted this exemption
in recognition of several facts: the frequent occurrence of such
situations,"' the proper flow of information which is likely to result
82
from the seeking or acceptance of directorships by broker-dealers,
effective market-making and the benefit
and the correlation between
3
of board representation.
It has been indicated that SEC rules and regulations under
the new exemption will consider a broker or dealer to be "making
a market" if at the time of a particular sale or purchase he was
willing to buy and sell the securities on a regular basis for his own
account at fair market prices.8 4 Whether a dealer will be regarded
as making a "primary" or a "secondary" market will depend on the
extent and the nature of the trading in which he engages. If he
is regarded as the principal source or market by brokers and dealers
having orders to buy the particular security, the broker or dealer
will be considered to be making a "primary" market. If regular
7 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1, at 428-29.
CCH, SEuRITms AcTs AMENDMENTS OF 1964 19 (1964). According
to the "sale against the box" provision the officer, director or qualifying
stockholder may not sell stock of the issuer unless: (1) he delivers it within
a twenty-day period after the sale, or (2) he places it in an authorized means
of transportation within five days after the sale.
79 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(d), as added, 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
(13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NFws 2816 (1964)).
78
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trading of a security is on a more limited basis, the broker or
dealer will be regarded as making a "secondary" market.8 5 If two
or more dealers are "making a market" in a security at the same
time, all such market-making transactions will be exempt. However,
a transaction by a dealer made as an incident to a market .established or maintained by another dealer would not be exempt.86
Securities held by the broker or dealer, either in his trading account
or in his investment account, will be taken into consideration for
purposes of the ten per cent test used in determining whether or
not a stockholder is subject
to the short-swing and short-sale
87
provisions of the 1934 Act.
The Special Study of the Securities Markets drew a distinction
between a mere "market-maker" and a "sponsor" in its consideration of the advisability of an exemption for market-makers.8s The
Special Study defines the term "make a market" as to "enter a
listing in the daily 'sheets' of the National Quotation Bureau and/or
to stand ready to buy or sell stock in a limited quantity."8 89 The
term "sponsorship," on the other hand, means the making of "a
continuous market in the securities of a particular issuer regularly
executing orders to buy or sell coming from other investors or
other dealers."90 If the short-swing and "sale against the box"
provisions were made applicable to sponsors who are also directors,
thereby forcing them to make a choice between the two positions,
some broker-dealers might elect to retain their directorships and
withdraw as a sponsor. By such loss of a sponsor, an issuer would
be deprived of its most reliable market, the one which remains
available during periods of market inactivity or instability when
investors' needs are most urgent. While SEC Chairman Cary has
said that the new exemption is designed to "take care of the so-called
sponsorship problem," 91 no distinction is made between "sponsors"
and other "market-makers." It is possible that such a distinction
will be made in regulations to be issued, but the Committee Reports
make no positive indication that it is forthcoming.
Conclusion
In the past the absence of financial reporting and the other
investor protections provided for listed securities has created special
burdens and difficulties for broker-dealers and their customers in
85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 49.
89 SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 45 n.90.
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dealing with over-the-counter securities. Because of the difficulty
in assessing the investment worth of securties of a non-reporting
company and because of the lack of statutory protections, many
investors drew a fairly sharp line between listed and unlisted
markets, so that many over-the-counter securities failed to attract
the degree of interest which they might have enjoyed if protections
were available.
Providing the protections of disclosure for investors in the
over-the-counter market will have a twofold effect: (1) it will encourage a development of that market, and (2) it will eliminate
the inherent inequities in the double standard of regulation. Securities should gravitate to the market which is best suited for them
without the arbitrary influence of regulations affecting issuers. The
allocation of capital resources can be significantly affected by
disclosure or the lack of it since adequate disclosure will tend to
inspire confidence in investors and, therefore, will ensure that
sound companies will be the ones that receive their funds. Full
disclosure, therefore, is an essential element of fair competition
and makes it possible for investors to make their decisions on the
basis of the actual merits of securities offered, and for the price
to be fairly determined by the laws of supply and demand. That
the principle is unassailable and that the need is clear have been
recognized. What remains is the implementation of this principle
by the means provided in the new law.

